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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
suit. This is an older view and was followed in Kingan & Co. v. Maryland
Casualty Co. (1917), 65 Ind. App. 182, 115 N. E. 348, in which it was held,
contrary to the holding in the more recent cases, that the insurer is not
required to settle for a sum within the face of the policy, but that he has
an election to defend, settle, or pay the face of the policy. Under this view
the insuring company is not subjected to the full risk of the litigation by
electing not to settle even though afterwards judgment is rendered in
excess of the indemnity provided by the policy. This rule is followed by
McAleenan v. Massachusetts Bond and Casualty Co. (1916), 173 App. Div.
100, 159 N. Y. S 401. In other instances the insurer was held liable only
to the extent of the face of the policy. Silverstein v. Standard Accident
Insurance Co. (1916), 175 App. Div. 639, 162 N. Y. S. 601; Wynnewood
Lumber Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co. (N. C. 1917), 91 S. E. 946; Ameri-
can Indemnity Co. v. Fellbaum (1924), 114 Tex. 127, 263 S. W. 908. These
cases seem to ignore the fundamental purpose of the assured in taking out
this indemnity insurance. He takes it as a protection. He would expect at
least the same reasonable care from the company in handling questions
arising under his policy that he would use himself. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the insurance contract contemplated a complete settlement of the
claim if possible in order to save the insured harmless. A more recent
and progressive view holds the company liable to the amount of the policy
either in case of settlement by the assured or a judgment against him.
Reilly v. Linden (1921), 151 Minn. 1, 186 N. W. 121. Still it does
not go far enough. The company should attempt to make the settlement
to the best advantage of all concerned. Reasonable prudence except in the
most exceptional case would be a settlement within the amount of the in-
demnity policy, when it is possible. The insurer owes the insured the duty
of settling before suit and is liable for failure to do so after finding that
the claim can be settled. Cavanaugh Bros. v. General Accident, Fire, and
Life Assurance Corp. (1919), 79 N. H. 186, 106 Atl. 604. The company
should be bound by the real purpose of the contract to take no needless
chances with the insured's funds. Clearly this is being done when the
case is allowed to go to a judgment. Douglas v. U. S. Fidelity and Guar-
anty Co. (1924), 81 N. H. 371, 127 Atl. 708. The general trend of cases
seems to be in the direction of the New Hampshire and Texas cases cited.
It is merely another instance of the increasing practicality of the holdings
of the courts. R. H. M., '30.
MARRIAGE--PARENTAL CONSENT-ANNULMENT.-In accordance with the
repeatedly-expressed reluctance of American courts to declare void a mar-
riage duly solemnized, though attended with irregularities or misrepre-
sentations in evading statutory regulations, the Supreme Court Of North
Carolina has declared that a minor, above the age of legal consent, whose
marriage was solemnized on the strength of a license procured by fraud
and without the parent's consent, cannot maintain an action to annul the
marriage. Sawyer v. Slack (1929), 196 N. C. 697, 146 S. E. 864.
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The decision interpreted a recent statutory amendment, Pub. L. 1923
c. 75 amending Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) 2494. The original statute pro-
vided that unmarried females of fourteen years and upwards might law-
fully marry. The amendment changed this age to sixteen, providing fur-
ther that females between fourteen and sixteen might marry on procure-
ment of a special license which was to be issued only with the consent of
the parent. Another statute declares void the marriage of a female under
fourteen years. Const. Stat. Ann. (1919) 1495. The court held that the
amendment did not change this latter statute, even by implication, and
that inasmuch as marriage below sixteen was thus not declared void, the
special license requirement is merely directory and will not support an
action for annulment.
Practically all states require consent of the parent for issuance of a
marriage license to a minor. But, even where common law marriage is
not recognized, such statutory requirements are construed as merely di-
rectory, unless they expressly declare a marriage contracted without the
prescribed consent to be void. Niland v. Niland (1924), 196 N. J. Eq.
438, 126 Atl. 530; Melcher v. Melcher (1918), 102 Neb. 790, 169 N. W. 720;
Radford v. Radford (1921), 214 Mich. 548, 183 N. W. 182; Harris v. Meyers
(1916), 50 N. S. 112, 30 D. L. R. 26.
Generally, the statutory declarations of the age of legal consent declare
marriage below that age void, but the statutes relating to parental con-
sent for marriage of minors above the age of legal consent do not. It often
appears that the provisions for parental consent, by implication, might be
interpreted to raise the age of consent and declare void a marriage con-
tracted without such consent. A dissenting opinion in the principal case
so interpreted the North Carolina amendment. But the courts have con-
sistently refused to imply such an intent on the part of the legislature.
Browning v. Browning (1913), 89 Kan. 98, 130 Pac. 852.
It has been held that the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act does not alter
this rule, since that Act is applicable only to a marriage which is declared
void by the laws of the state in which the act is in force. Unless the
statute expressly declares void a marriage without parental consent, such
statute is directory only and the Marriage Evasion Act does not affect it.
Schwartz v. Schwartz (1925), 236 Ill. App. 336; Lyannes v. Lyannes (1920),
171 Wis. 381, 177 N. W. 683.
In Missouri, prior to 1921, the statute requiring that a license be obtained
previous to any marriage (R. S. Mo. [1919] sec. 7302) was declared merely
directory. State v. Bittick (1890), 103 Mo. 183, 15 S. W. 325. An amend-
ment (Mo. Laws 1921, p. 468) to this statute added the words, "--no mar-
riage hereafter contracted shall be recognized as valid unless such license
has been previously obtained,-" and expressly declares common law mar-
riage void. The statute requiring parental consent to issuance of a
license to a female under eighteen years and a male under twenty-one years
does not declare void a marriage without such consent. R. S. Mo. (1919)
see. 7308. (Mo. Laws 1921 p. 399, raising the age of majority of females
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to twenty-one years, has been interpreted by the Attorney-General to pro-
hibit issuance of a license to a female under twenty-one without parental
consent.) May, MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1929) 233. There has been no court interpretation of the effect of the 1921
amendment on the marriage of a minor solemnized on the strength of a
license procured without parental consent by fraud or misrepresentation.
It appears that the statute requiring parental consent is merely directory,
and the amendment does not affect the validity of such a marriage.
T. G. J., '31.
OM AND GAS-POWER OF CITY TO REGULATE DRILLING OF WELL.-An
ordinance of the City of Oxford, Kansas, prohibits the drilling of a well
for oil or gas in certain districts of the city, except by permit issued by the
governing body, which is directed to issue only one permit in each block in
the restricted area. The property owners in such blocks are given the right
to share in the proceeds of that well by contributing to the operating ex-
penses in proportion to the amount of land owned, if they have not leased
their oil right to the company securing the permit. By the ordinance wells
cannot be drilled within a certain distance from streets or railways, and
must be properly walled in when near a residence or business building. A
penalty is provided for drilling without a permit and for violations of other
clauses of the ordinance. Two cases which arose under this ordinance
upon an application for an injunction to restrain the city from enforcing
it, were united on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Marrs v. City of
Oxford and Ramsey v. City of Oxford (C. C. A. 8, 1929), 32 F. (2d) 134.
The ordinance was held constitutional as within the police power, since the
object was clearly to protect the public safety and convenience of the town's
inhabitants. The police power extends not only to the protection of the
public safety, health, and morals, but to the protection of common con-
venience, prosperity, and welfare. State v. Wilson (1917), 101 Kan. 789,
168 Pac. 679. See also Crowley v. Christenson (1890), 137 U. S. 86. The
court also rejected the contention that the ordinance forced property hold-
ers into a partnership with the company securing the permit.
The ordinance was well within the power granted to the town in R. S. Kan.
(1923) secs. 15-401, 15-440; Kan. Laws 1925 c. 100; Kan. Laws 1927 c. 110,
which provided that any city of the second or third class might pass such
laws as it deemed expedient for good government, for the benefit of trade
and commerce, for zoning the city for the erection of buildings, and for
the general welfare of the city.
To support its decision the court quoted from Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana
(1899), 177 U. S. 190, to the effect that though property in oil and gas is
in the first taker, there is a co-equal right in surface owners to take from
a common source. Consequently, legislative power may be exerted "to
protect all collective owners, by securing a just distribution, to arise from
enjoyment by them, of their privilege to reduce to possession, and to reach
a like end of preventing waste."
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